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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Mr. Morgan appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction and Order
Retaining Jurisdiction and asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress.

The district court denied Mr. Morgan's motion to suppress based upon a

finding that Officer Stace had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Morgan had
violated either Idaho Code § 49-428 (display of plates and stickers) or Idaho Code § 49659 (stopping, standing or parking outside business or residential districts). The State
now concedes that the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress on these
bases recognizing that Mr. Morgan did not, in fact, violate either of these two statutes.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10.) However, the State now asserts, for the first time on
appeal, that Mr. Morgan's stop was justified based upon an alleged violation of Boise
City Code § 10-11-04 (hereinafter, B.C.C. § 10-11-04), and further asserts that Officer
Stace's belief that Mr. Morgan was either lost or was attempting to avoid him justified
his warrantless seizure of Mr. Morgan.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's newly raised arguments.
First, Mr. Morgan asserts that this Court should decline to address the State's argument
that Mr. Morgan violated B.C.C. § 10-11-04 as it is being raised for the first time on
appeal, and the State has not established that the operative facts presented and found
by the district court support a finding that Mr. Morgan violated the ordinance. Second, if
this Court entertains the State's argument that Mr. Morgan violated B.C.C. § 10-11-04,
this Court should find that the ordinance is void ab initio as Boise City ceded its ability to
regulate the streets of Boise to the Ada County Highway District and has no legal
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authority to pass a parking regulation. Third, even if this Court both addresses the
alleged violation of B.C.C. § 10-11-04 and finds that the ordinance is valid, it should
nevertheless find that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding
that it was objectively reasonable for Officer Stace to believe Mr. Morgan parked in
violation of the ordinance. Finally, this Court should affirm the district court's finding that
Officer Stace did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity merely
because Mr. Morgan appeared be either lost or trying to avoid him.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Morgan's Appellant's Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief in

depth, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Morgan's motion to suppress as his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures was violated?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Morgan's Motion To Suppress As His
Fourth Amendment Right To Be Free From Unreasonable Seizures Was Violated

A.

Introduction
The State concedes that the district court erred in finding that Officer Stace had a

reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Morgan had violated either I.C. § 49-428 or
I.C. § 49-659.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10.)

This Court should reject the State's

alternative argument, raised for the first time in its Respondent's Brief, that Officer Stace
had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Morgan had violated B.C.C. § 10-11-04,
and should further affirm the district court's finding that Officer Stace had no other
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop.

B.

This Court Should Reject The State's Argument, Raised For The First Time On
Appeal, That The Warrantless Stop Was Reasonable Based Upon An Alleged
Violation Of B.C.C. § 10-11-04
As a general rule, appellate courts will not review claims raised for the first time

on appeal. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). However, the Idaho Supreme
Court has established that because the reasonableness of a seizure is judged by an
objective standard, an appellate court may review the propriety of a warrantless seizure,
regardless of the district court's ruling on the issue, by reviewing the "operative facts" to
see if they justify the warrantless seizure on an alternative basis. See State v. Julian,
129 Idaho 133 (1996).
In Julian, the defendant was arrested at a hospital, without a warrant, based
upon probable cause to believe that he had committed the crime of domestic violence at
his home and, during a standard inventory search at the jail, a small vial of cocaine fell
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out of the defendant's shoe.

Id. at 134.

The district court granted the defendant's

motion to suppress finding that his arrest was unlawful under the then-existing Idaho
arrest statute, which arguably barred an arrest for a crime stemming from a "domestic
disturbance" when not made at the scene of the disturbance. Id. at 134-135; I.C. § 19603(6) (1993).

Recognizing that the existence of probable cause to arrest is an

objective standard freely reviewed on appeal, and relying upon Klingler v. United States,
409 F.2d 299 (8 th Cir. 1969), the "lead opinion" concluded that,
the officer's decision to cite Julian for domestic battery does not foreclose
an inquiry into whether an objective assessment of the facts present at the
moment of arrest would lead a person of ordinary prudence to conclude
that probable cause existed to arrest Julian for a felony arising from
the same operative facts supporting the domestic battery arrest, i.e.
aggravated battery .
... [W]e hold that an objective assessment of the facts found by the district
court gave the deputies probable cause to arrest Julian for aggravated
battery.
Id. at 135-137 (emphasis added).1 The Court reversed the district court's suppression

of the evidence. Id.
In the present case, the operative facts presented to and found by the district
court do not justify a seizure 2 based upon an alleged violation of B.C.C. § 10-11-04.

1 Justice Silak, joined by Judge Lansing, Pro Tem, wrote the "lead" opinion in this case
and found that it was not necessary to determine whether the district court correctly
interpreted I.C. § 19-603(6). Justice Walters, Pro Tem, joined by Judge Drescher, Pro
Tem, found "[t]he Court's lead opinion ably and thoughtfully applies the holding of
Klingler v. United States, 409 F.2d 299 (8 th Cir. 1969)", but determined that the arrest
itself did not violate I.C. § 19-603(6). In State v. Schwarz, 133 Idaho 463 (1999), a
unanimous Court referenced this portion of the julian opinion as the Court's
"conclu[sion]." Id. at 468 (quoting Julian, 129 Idaho at 137.) Therefore, the Julian
analysis is a correct statement of Idaho law.
2 The Julian Court looked to the operative facts to determine if probable cause to justify
a warrantless arrest existed, whereas in the present case, the question is whether a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify a warrantless seizure is at
issue. As both probable cause to arrest and reasonable suspicion to seize are objective
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First and foremost, the State failed to prove the existence of the ordinance in the district
court. The existence of an ordinance is a factual question that must be proven to the
trier of fact. See Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867 (1988); People v. Buchanan, 1 Idaho
681 (1878). In Marcher, a "slip and fall case" wherein the plaintiff "tersely mentioned a
violation of the Blaine County Building Code, but failed to attach a copy of that
ordinance" in a response to a motion for summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's grant of the defendant's summary judgment motion.
Marcher, 113 Idaho at 867-870.

The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the

district court should have taken judicial notice of the building code, noting that
"[i]nasmuch as [I.C. § 9-101] only permits a court to take judicial notice of legislative
acts, it follows that the court may not take judicial notice of city ordinances or of the
various codes adopted under them." Id. at 870.
Furthermore, after summary judgment was granted, the plaintiff filed a '''Motion to
Alter or Amended Judgment''' and attached a copy of the Blaine County ordinances in
question in a supporting memorandum; however, the district court denied the motion.
Id. at 868-869.

In affirming the district court's denial of the plaintiff's motion, the

Supreme Court recognized, "[b]ecause this motion attempts to present new information
which the trial court did not have before it when rendering its decision granting summary
judgment, the motion must be considered a motion for relief from judgment under
I.R.C.P. 60(b), at least with regard to the issue of negligence per se for violation of a
safety statute."

Id. at 870.

The Court determined that the failure to present the

standards subject to de novo review, the "operative facts" analysis should be equally
applied to each type of case. See Julian, supra; see also State v. Benefiel, 131 Idaho
226 (1998).
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evidence of the ordinances to the district court was "at best ... a mistaken
understanding as to the ability to take judicial notice of municipal ordinances, or at
worst, the municipal ordinance argument was not contemplated by Marcher until after
the decision granting summary judgment." Id. at 871.
Neither the prosecutor nor Officer Stace ever mentioned the existence of
B.C.C. § 10-11-04, let alone provide any actual proof that it was legally adopted.
(R., ppAO-41; Tr. 6/15/10.) The State cannot make the argument impliedly made by the

plaintiff in Marcher that it merely misunderstood the rules regarding judicial notice, an
excuse the Marcher Court did not abide. The State simply did not think of raising this
argument until after it received Mr. Morgan's Appellant's Brief and recognized, by its
own admission, the district court erred in affirming Mr. Morgan's warrantess seizure on
the bases proffered by the prosecutor and Officer Stace. Even if the district court could
have taken judicial notice of B.C.C. § 10-11-04, it simply did not do so and this operative
fact was not found by the district court. The State's lack of diligence in presenting any
evidence of the existence of the parking ordinance in this case should not be glossed
over by this Court in the name of affirming the denial of Mr. Morgan's suppression
motion, as the State would have this Court do.

This operative fact was not proven in

the district court and, thus, cannot be cited by this Court as a basis to conclude
Mr. Morgan's seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
In raising the argument that this Court should find that the stop was justified
based upon an alleged violation of B.C.C. § 10-11-04, the State makes the general
claim that an appellate Court will affirm the order of a district court where the district
court reaches the correct result by an incorrect theory. (Respondent's Brief, p.6 (citing
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McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700 (1999); State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704
(1997).)

However, the State has not cited any authority that overturns Julian and

applies this "right result - wrong reason" theory of appellate review in the context of
review of a district court's decision that would allow the appellate court to determine a
suppression issue based upon facts neither presented nor found by the district court.
Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed the Julian analysis in State v. Schwarz,
133 Idaho 463 (1999); see also See State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509, 515 fn.4 (2010)
(reiterating the general prohibition against an appellate court hearing an argument for
the first time on appeal, but deciding to hear the State's argument that the "good faith
exception" to the exclusionary due to a change in United States Supreme Court
precedent between the time the case was heard in the district court and the Court of
Appeals, and the time the case was heard in the Idaho Supreme Court).
In essence, the State is asking this Court to be a finder of face This Court
should decline this invitation.

It is well established that this Court, as an appellate

tribunal, does not engage in its own fact finding on review. See, e.g., State v. Meister,

Curiously, the State has failed to provide sufficient evidence of the existence of B.C.C.
10-11-04 on this appeal. Appendix A of the Respondent's Brief appears to be a printout
taken directly from the city's official website. Compare Respondent's Brief, Appendix A
with http://www.cityofboise.org/Departments/City_Clerk/PDF/CityCodeITitle1 0/1 011.pdf
(pages 3 of 14 to 5 of 14.) However, the city's website itself contains a preface to the
purported code sections stating,
This is the unofficial copy of the Boise City Code and does not legally
bind the City in anyway. This Code is published for reference purposes
only, it may not reflect recent changes to the code and should not be
used for any official purpose. For an official copy of any part of the
Boise City Code - Please contact the Office of the City Clerk. The Boise
City Code is the sole property of the City of Boise, any unauthorized use
or modification of this code is illegal.
See http://www.cityofboise.org/Departments/City_ClerklCityCode/index.aspx (emphasis
added).
3
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148 Idaho 236, 239 (2009) (concluding that the appellate courts are not fact-finding
tribunals and declining to make a determination on the admissibility of the evidence at
issue); Lynch v. Lynch, 106 Idaho 842,845-846 (1984) (it is an invasion of the province
of the trial for an appellate court to readjudicate controverted facts); Thomas v. Klein, 99
Idaho 105, 109 (1978) (scope of appellate review is limited, and appellate court will not
retry issues of fact or substitute its view of such issues for the trial court). The State had
an opportunity in the district court to present facts sufficient to justify Mr. Morgan's
warrantless seizure. By its own admission, the State failed to do so. This Court should
not give the State an opportunity to argue facts never presented to or found by the
district court in the hope of saving its unconstitutional seizure of Mr. Morgan.
Furthermore, even if this Court excuses the State's failure to prove B.C.C. § 1011-04 in the district court, there are still inadequate operative facts to justify an appellate
finding that the seizure was valid.

By its express terms, B.C.C. § 10-11-04(D) (the

specific subsection relied upon by the State), does not apply "in a business or restricted
parking district." B.C.C. § 10-11-04(D). The State failed to provide any evidence that
the location of the stop was neither in a business district nor a restricted parking district.
(R., pp.40-41; Tr. 6/15/10.) The district court was not asked to, nor did it make such a
finding; therefore, this operative fact was not proven and this Court should not
retroactively find Mr. Morgan's seizure was justified based upon the State's newly found
appellate theory. (R., pp.40-41, 51-56; Tr. 6/15/10.)
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C.

If This Court Entertains The State's Argument That Mr. Morgan Violated Boise
City Code § 10-11-04, This Court Should Find That Boise City Did Not Have The
Authority To Enact This Parking Regulation; Thus, It Has No Legal Effect And
Cannot Be The Basis For The Stop
Mr. Morgan asserts that the City did not have the authority to enact the

B.C.C. § 10-11-04, as the Ada County Highway District (hereinafter, ACHD) and the
State have sale jurisdiction over all of the highways located within Ada County, including
those within the City of Boise. 4

If the City did not have the authority to enact the

ordinance, then Mr. Morgan's stop cannot be justified on the basis of an alleged
violation of B.C.C. § 10-11-04. 5
Mr. Morgan asserts that, other than the State, the ACHD has sale jurisdiction
over all highways within Ada County, including those within the City. Id. Article III, § 1,
of the Idaho Constitution vests all legislative power, other than the referendum and
initiative power reserved to the people, in the Legislature. IDAHO CONST. Art. III, § 1.
Article XII, § 2, of the Idaho Constitution provides, "Any county or incorporated city or
town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such local, police, sanitary and other

Mr. Morgan fully recognizes that this argument is more appropriately made in the
district court and generally should not be raised for the first time on appeal. However,
the State never attempted to justify Mr. Morgan's warrantless seizure based upon
B.C.C. § 10-11-04 until its Respondent's Brief. If this Court entertains the State's new
theory for the first time on appeal, due process dictates hearing Mr. Morgan's
constitutional and statutory challenge for the first time on appeal as well.
C.f.
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475-476 (1973) ("hold[ing] that in the absence of a
strong showing of state interests to the contrary, discovery must be a two-way street.
The State may not insist that trials be run as a 'search for truth' so far as defense
witnesses are concerned, while maintaining 'poker game' secrecy for its own witnesses.
It is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge the details of his own case
while at the same time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise concerning refutation of
the very pieces of evidence which he disclosed to the State.")
5 The State cannot rely upon a claim that Officer Stace was acting in "good faith"
reliance on B.C.C. § 10-11-04 as Officer State was not acting in reliance of B.C.C. 1011-04 at all. See Tr. 6/15/10, p.14, Ls.20-22; See also Frederick, 149 Idaho at 517.
4
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regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws." IDAHO CONST.
Art. XII, § 2.
State law defines a "[s]ingle highway traffic district" as consisting of "all public
highways within the county, including those within all cities of the county, but excepting
those

within

the

state

highway

system

and

those

under

federal

controL"

I.C. § 40-120(4) (emphasis added.) Idaho Code § 40-113(3) provides, '''Local highway
jurisdiction' means a county with jurisdiction over a highway system, a city with
jurisdiction over a highway system, or a highway district." I.C. § 40-113(3) (emphasis

added). Idaho Code. § 40-104(1), in relevant part, provides, '''City system' means all
public highways within the corporate limits of a city, with a functioning street
department, except those highways which are ... part of a highway district system .... "
I.C. § 40-104(1) (emphasis added).
From these statutes, it is clear that Idaho cities lack jurisdiction over any
highways that are within a single highway traffic district because such highways are no
longer part of the city's system of highways. Only the State and the single highway
traffic district can exercise jurisdiction over highways located within such a district.
The ACHD was established in 1972, and "is the only consolidated countywide
highway district in the State of Idaho."s As such, the ACHD has exclusive jurisdiction
over any and all highways located within Ada County, including those within the City.
Under state law, the term highways includes all "roads, streets, alleys and bridges laid
out or established for the public or dedicated or abandoned to the public."
I.C. § 40-109(5). Under this definition, Mr. Morgan parked on a "highway" at the time of
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his seizure and that highway was within the City of Boise. Therefore, only the ACHD
and the State had jurisdiction over his conduct.
Idaho Code § 49-208, in relevant part, provides:
(1) The provisions of this title shall not be deemed to prevent local
authorities with respect to highways under their jurisdiction and within the
reasonable exercise of the police power from:
(a) Regulating or prohibiting stopping, standing or parking;
(b) Regulating traffic by means of peace officers or traffic-control devices[.]
I.C. § 49-208 (emphasis added).

Idaho Code § 49-207(1), in relevant part, provides,

"These provisions of law shall not be construed to prevent cities from enacting and
enforcing general ordinances prescribing additional requirements as to speed, manner
of driving, or operating vehicles on any of the highways of such cities .... " I.C. § 49-207
(emphasis added).
These provisions grant a municipal corporation the ability, in general, to regulate
the highways within their boundaries.

However, the City of Boise has ceded its

authority, granted by the Idaho Constitution and Idaho code, to ACHD. Idaho Code §
40-1310, in relevant part, provides:
(1) The commissioners of a highway district have exclusive general
supervision and jurisdiction over all highways and public rights-of-way
within their highway system ....

(8) The highway district board of commissioners shall have the exclusive
general supervisory authority over all public highways, public streets and
public rights-of-way under their jurisdiction, with full power to establish
design standards, establish use standards, pass resolutions and establish
regulations in accordance with the provisions of title 49, Idaho Code, and

ACHD, "About Us," at http://www.achdidaho.org/AboutACHD/Default.aspx (last visited
Dec. 20,2011).

6
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control access to said public highways, public streets and public rights-ofway.
I.C. § 40-1310 (emphases added). By ceding its power to regulate highways within the
City of Boise to the ACHD, the City of Boise ceded its power to enact B.C.C. § 10-1104.
"Idaho has long recognized the proposition that a municipal corporation, as a
creature of the state, possesses and exercises only those powers either expressly or
impliedly granted to it." Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158,160 (1980). In Black v. Young,
122 Idaho 302 (1992), this Court noted that, when a city acts without lawful authority,
such an act is ultra vires and considered null and void.

Id. at 308-309. Mr. Morgan

asserts that it is clear, under any reasonable reading of the relevant provisions of
I.C. § 40-1310 and the portions of title 49 set forth above, that the ACHD and the State
had exclusive jurisdiction to enact regulations governing the operation of motor vehicles
on all highways within Ada County. The City of Boise lacked any such jurisdiction by
operation of those statutes.
Mr. Morgan asserts that because the City lacked jurisdiction to enact the
ordinance (or any ordinance that regulates the operation of motor vehicles on highways
within the ACHD), it is null and void ab initio and, as a matter of law, never existed.
Because the ordinance was never valid, it cannot be used by the either the State or this
Court as retroactive justification for Mr. Morgan's warrantless seizure.
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D.

If This Court Reaches The Merits Of The State's Argument That Mr. Morgan's
Stop Was Justified Due To His Alleged Violation Of B.C.C. § 10-11-04, It Should
Find That Under The Facts Presented, It Was Objectively Unreasonable For
Officer Stace To Seize Mr. Morgan Based Upon This Alleged Violation
Even if this Court reaches the merits of the State's newly raised claim, it should

find that the facts presented do not support a finding that it was objectively reasonable
for Officer Stace to believe Mr. Morgan was violating B.C.C. § 10-11-04. As noted in
Section B above, the State failed to provide any evidence of the existence of B.C.C.
§1 0-11-04, and further failed to provide any evidence that Mr. Morgan was not parked in
either a business district nor a restricted parking zone, both of which are necessary
findings of fact to support an objectively reasonable suspicion of Mr. Morgan violating
this municipal code section. This Court should decline the State's invitation to affirm the
denial of Mr. Morgan's suppression motion based upon its newly proposed theory, in the
absence of sufficient evidence to support its theory.

E.

Officer Stace Did Not Possess A Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion That
Mr. Morgan Was Involved In Criminal Activity To Justify His Seizure
The district court found that "It goes without saying that Officer Stace's suspicion

that Mr. Morgan was avoiding him was not the type of suspicion sufficient to permit an
investigatory stop and detention." (R., p.53.) The State challenges the district court's
legal determination in this regard. The State's argument is without merit.
The State asserts that "[i]t was reasonable for Officer Stace to suspect, based on
Morgan's driving pattern and subsequent stop in the street, that ... Morgan was
attempting to conceal his actions from him." (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-14.) The State
then relies upon Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) and United States v. Arvizu,
534 U.S. 266 (2002), for the position that "[a]ttempts to avoid police, then, are a
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pertinent factor in deciding whether an officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity." (Respondent's Brief, pp.14-15.)
However, a perceived attempt to avoid police is not, in and of itself, sufficient to
justify a warrantless seizure.

In Wardlow, the defendant's seizure was not justified

merely because it looked to the officer like he was trying to avoid police contact; rather,
the defendant was in area known for heavy drug trafficking, saw four police cars drive
up, dropped a bag he was holding, and ran from the police. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121122.

The Wardlow Court recognized that both being in a high-crime area and

"[h]eadlong flight" can be considered, in a totality of the circumstance analysis, when
determining whether an officer has an objectively reasonable suspicion that the
defendant may be involved in criminal activity, and found that the officer in the present
case was justified in suspecting the defendant was involved in criminal activity. Id. at
124-125.) This findings are far from radical considering long standing Supreme Court
precedent that looks to the totality of the circumstances and objectively reviews the
facts as found.
The Wardlow Court, continued,
Such a holding is entirely consistent with our decision in Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), where we held that
when an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause,
approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the
police and go about his business. Id., at 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319. And any
"refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal
level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure."
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389
(1991). But unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate.
Flight, by its very nature, is not "going about one's business"; in fact, it is
just the opposite. Allowing officers confronted with such flight to stop the
fugitive and investigate further is quite consistent with the individual's right
to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of
police questioning.
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Id. at 125 (emphasis added).

Importantly, the Wardlow Court rejected the State of

Illinois' request for a '''bright-line rule' authorizing the temporary detention of anyone
who flees at the mere sight of a police officer. Id. at 126-127 (J. Stevens concurring in

part, dissenting in part (recognizing the majority's rejection of the "bright-line rule"
request).) In other words, looking like one wants to avoid an interaction with an officer
is far different then seeing an officer and running away and seeing an officer and
running away is not sufficient, in and of itself, to justify a warrantless seizure.
The State basically asks this Court to adopt that which the Wardlow Court
rejected - a "bright-line rule" that would allow any officer to seize any person at any time
merely because that person appeared to be avoiding the officer. The State would have
this Court hold that exercising ones rights provides an officer with the very basis to
seize a person. Such a holding would write the Fourth Amendment out of existence.
The mere fact that the State can point to additional facts, such as it was 9:20
p.m. on a Friday night, when the officer saw an SUV that did not have a front license
plate, and drive around the block and parked along the side of the road, does not make
the State's argument more compelling. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.13-16.) In reality,
the facts relied upon by the State show that Officer Stace had a "hunch" that
Mr. Morgan was either up to no good or was just lost, but a hunch is simply not enough
to justify a warrantless seizure.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 at 27.

The district court

declined to adopt the State's spurious argument and this Court should decline to
overrule the district court on this basis.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Morgan respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
of judgment and commitment, reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress,
and remand his case to the district court with instructions that all evidence obtained
after his seizure must be suppressed.
DATED this 21 st day of December, 2011.

JA ON C. PINTL
De uty State Appellate Public Defender
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